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We estimate several variants of a linearized form of a New Keynesian model using
quarterly US data. Using these rival models and the estimated posterior probabilities
we then design rules that are robust in two senses: ‘weakly robust’ rules are guaranteed
to be stable and determinate in all the possible variants of the model, whereas ‘strongly
robust’ rules, in addition, use the probabilities to minimize an expected loss function
of the central bank subject to this model uncertainty. We ﬁnd three main results.
First, in our two model variants with the highest posterior model probabilities there
are substantial stabilization gains from commitment. Second, an optimized inﬂation
targeting rule feeding back on current inﬂation will result in a unique stable equilibrium
and realize at least three-quarters of these potential gains, even if it is used in a variant
of the model that is not the one for which it was designed. Third, the performance
of optimimized inﬂation targeting rules perform increasing less well as the forward
horizon increases from j = 0 to j = 1,2 quarters. For j=2, only a rule designed for
our most indeterminacy-prone model is weakly robust and yields determinacy across
all models. A strongly robust rule can be designed that sacriﬁces performance in the
least probable models for better performance in the most probable models.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E37, E58
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B Estimation Results 481 Introduction
”Uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the
deﬁning characteristic of that landscape.” Alan Greenspan1
This paper adopts a consistently Bayesian approach to the measurement of uncertainty
and the design of robust rules for the conduct of monetary policy. Employing a New Key-
nesian model, the source of uncertainty in our paper concerns the structural parameters
and the volatility of the white noise disturbances. We estimate several variants of a lin-
earized form of the model using quarterly US data. From these competing speciﬁcations
we obtain estimates for posterior model probabilities. Using these rival models and the
estimated probabilities we then design rules that are robust in two senses: ‘weakly ro-
bust’ rules are guaranteed to be stable and determinate in all the possible variants of the
model whereas ‘strongly robust’ rules, also guarantee stable and unique equilibria and, in
addition, use the probabilities to minimize an expected loss function of the central bank
subject to this model uncertainty.
Our approach thus diﬀers from existing work on the design of robust policy rules in
two important respects. First, existing work typically posits uncertainty by arbitrarily
calibrating the relative probability of alternative models being true representations of the
economy (see for example Angeloni et al. (2003); Coenen (2003)). This paper provides a
ﬁrst attempt to quantify and at the same time utilize estimated measures of uncertainty
for the design of robust rules. Second we examine robust policy in a uniﬁed framework
that compares diﬀerent simple rules with each other, and with their optimal counterparts.
Throughout we focus on Taylor-type rules, and in particular on inﬂation-forecast-based
(IFB) rules. These are ‘simple’ rules as in Taylor (1993), but where the policy instrument
responds to deviations of expected, rather than current inﬂation from target. In most
applications, the inﬂation forecasts underlying IFB rules are taken to be the endogenous
rational-expectations forecasts conditional on an intertemporal equilibrium of the model.
These rules are of speciﬁc interest because similar reaction functions are used in the
Quarterly Projection Model of the Bank of Canada (see Coletti et al. (1996)), and in
the Forecasting and Policy System of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (see Black et al.
(1997)) – two prominent inﬂation targeting central banks. As shown in Clarida et al.
1Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas (2003), Opening Remarks.
1(2000) and Castelnuovo (2003), estimates of IFB-type rules appear to be a good ﬁt to
the actual monetary policy in the US and Europe of recent years.) However, with IFB
rules indeterminacy can be particularly severe and can take two forms: if the response of
interest rates to a rise in expected inﬂation is insuﬃcient, then real interest rates fall thus
raising demand and conﬁrming any exogenous expected inﬂation. But indeterminacy is
also possible if the rule is overly aggressive (Bernanke and Woodford (1997); Batini and
Pearlman (2002); Giannoni and Woodford (2002); Batini et al. (2004), BLP hereafter).
We ﬁnd three main results. First, in our two model variants with the highest posterior
model probabilities there are substantial stabilization gains from commitment. This is
measured for each model by comparing the expected loss from the optimal policies with
and without commitment. We assess this gain to be between a 3.6% to 9.4% equivalent
permanent increase in output. Second, an optimized inﬂation targeting rule feeding back
on current inﬂation will result in a unique stable equilibrium and realize at least three-
quarters of these potential gains even if the implemented rule is designed for the wrong
model. Current inﬂation rules, in other words, are robust in both the weak and strong
sense. Third, the optimized inﬂation targeting rules perform increasing less well as the
forward horizon increases from j = 0 (the current inﬂation rule) to j = 1,2 quarters.
Denoting such a rule by IFBj, we ﬁnd a qualitative diﬀerence between IFB1 and IFB2
rules. For IFB1 optimal rules, a rule designed for the wrong model is still weakly robust,
but for IFB2 optimal rules this is no longer the case. Then only a rule designed for
our most indeterminacy-prone model is weakly robust and yields determinacy across all
models. In both cases a strongly robust rule can be designed that sacriﬁces performance
in the least probable models for better performance in the most probable models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a New Keynesian
model which, in its most general form, exhibits persistence in both inﬂation and output.
Sections 4 examines the indeterminacy problem of IFB rules using the root locus method
employed by Batini and Pearlman (2002) and BLP. This analysis indicates which features
of the model make it indeterminacy-prone. Section 5 ﬁrst focuses on IFB and optimal
rules without uncertainty before we turn to the robust policy problem in section 6. A ﬁnal
section 7 provides conclusions. The general solution solution procedures for computing
the optimal rules are set out in an Appendix.
22 Recent Related Literature
Not surprisingly other approaches to policy design with uncertainty are found in a rapidly
growing literature. Hansen and Sargent (2002) (henceforth H&S) adopt a minmax frame-
work with three key ingredients that distinguishes it from alternatives. First, it conducts
‘local analysis’ in the sense that it assumes that the true model is known only up to some
local neighborhood of models that surround the ‘approximating’ or ‘core’ model. Second,
it uses a minmax criterion without priors in model space. Third, the type of uncertainty is
both unstructured and additive being reﬂected in additive shock processes that are ‘chosen’
by malevolent nature to feed back on state variables so has to maximize the loss function
the policy-maker is trying to minimize. Another strand retains the minmax framework
but assumes bounded uncertainty about the values of certain parameters in the model
(Giannoni (2002), Gaspar and Smets (2002), Angeloni et al. (2003)). Tetlow and von zur
Muehlen (2002) provides a comparison of the H&S unstructured model uncertainty and
the latter structured approaches. Walsh (2003) provides a useful overview of the literature
and and carries out a number of policy exercises using a similar New Keynesian model
to that in our paper. First, he assesses Taylor rules and ﬁrst diﬀerence rules when target
variables in these rules can only be measured imperfectly. Second, he examines ‘robust,
optimal, explicit instrument rules’ proposed by Giannoni and Woodford (2002) and Svens-
son and Woodford (1999) that are robust in the sense of being independent of both the
variance-covariance structure of the white-noise disturbances and the serial correlation of
the disturbances. Third, he implements the H&S robust control procedure. The conclu-
sions most relevant to our paper are that uncertainty about the output gap suggests using
a ﬁrst diﬀerence rule, and that parameter uncertainty has no general implications for the
size of the feedback coeﬃcients in the optimized simple rules.
3 The Model
Our model is the closed economy version of BLP. There is one traded risk-free nominal
bond. A ﬁnal homogeneous good is produced competitively using a CES technology con-
sisting of a continuum of diﬀerentiated non-traded goods. Intermediate goods producers
and household suppliers of labor have monopolistic power. Nominal prices of intermediate
3goods, are sticky. We incorporate a bias for consumption of home-produced goods, habit
formation in consumption, and Calvo price setting with indexing of prices for those ﬁrms
who, in a particular period, do not re-optimize their prices. The latter two aspects of the
model follow Christiano et al. (2001) and, as with these authors, our motivation is an em-
pirical one: to generate suﬃcient inertia in the model so as to enable it, in calibrated form,
to reproduce commonly observed output, inﬂation and nominal interest rate responses to
exogenous shocks.
Our model is stochastic with two exogenous AR(1) stochastic processes for total factor
productivity in the intermediate goods sector and government spending.
3.1 Households























where Et is the expectations operator indicating expectations formed at time t, Ct(r) is
an index of consumption, Nt(r) are hours worked, Ht represents the habit, or desire not
to diﬀer too much from other consumers, and we choose it as Ht = hCt−1, where Ct is
the average consumption index and h ∈ [0,1). When h = 0, σ > 1 is the risk aversion
parameter (or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution)2. Mt(r) are end-
of-period nominal money balances and u(Gt) is the utility from exogenous real government
spending Gt.
The representative household r must obey a budget constraint:
PtCt(r) + Dt(r) + Mt(r) = Wt(r)Nt(r) + (1 + it−1)Dt−1(r) + Mt−1(r) + Γt(r) − Ptτt (2)
where Pt is a price index, Dt(r) are end-of-period holdings of riskless nominal bonds with
nominal interest rate it over the interval [t,t + 1]. Wt(r) is the wage, Γt(r) are dividends
from ownership of ﬁrms and τt are lump-sum real taxes. In addition, if we assume that
households’ labour supply is diﬀerentiated with elasticity of supply η, then (as we shall







2When h  = 0, σ is merely an index of the curvature of the utility function.
4where Wt =
   1
0 Wt(r)1−ηdr
  1
1−η is an average wage index and Nt =
  1
0 Nt(r)dr is aggre-
gate employment.
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (3) and imposing symmetry on households (so that
Ct(r) = Ct, etc) yields standard results:




























t (Ct − Ht)σ (6)
(4) is the familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule adapted to take into account of the consumption
habit. In (5), the demand for money balances depends positively on consumption relative
to habit and negatively on the nominal interest rate. Given the central bank’s setting of
the latter, (5) is completely recursive to the rest of the system describing our macro-model
and will be ignored in the rest of the paper. (6) reﬂects the market power of households
arising from their monopolistic supply of a diﬀerentiated factor input with elasticity η.
3.2 Firms
Competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrms use a continuum of non-traded intermediate goods according
to a constant returns CES technology to produce aggregate output
Yt =





where ζ is the elasticity of substitution. This implies a set of demand equations for each
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0 Pt(m)1−ζdm
  1
1−ζ. Pt is an aggregate intermediate price index, but since
ﬁnal goods ﬁrms are competitive and the only inputs are intermediate goods, it is also the
domestic price level.
In the intermediate goods sector each good m is produced by a single ﬁrm m using
only diﬀerentiated labour with another constant returns CES technology:
Yt(m) = At





5where Ntm(r) is the labour input of type r by ﬁrm m and At is an exogenous shock
capturing shifts to trend total factor productivity (TFP) in this sector. Minimizing costs
  1
0 Wt(r)Ntm(r)dr and aggregating over ﬁrms leads to the demand for labor as shown in
(3). In a equilibrium of equal households and ﬁrms, all wages adjust to the same level Wt
and it follows that Yt = AtNt.
For later analysis it is useful to deﬁne the real marginal cost as the wage relative to












(Ct − Ht)σ (10)
Now we assume that there is a probability of 1 − ξ at each period that the price of
each intermediate good m is set optimally to P0
t (m). If the price is not re-optimized,
then it is indexed to last period’s aggregate producer price inﬂation.3 With indexation














,... . For each intermediate producer m the






















































+ (1 − ξ)(P0
t+1)1−ζ (13)
3.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, goods markets, money markets and the bond market all clear. Equating
the supply and demand of the consumer good we obtain
Yt = ANt = Ct + Gt (14)
3Thus we can interpret
1
1−ξ as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged.
6A balanced budget government budget constraint




completes the model. Given interest rates i (expressed later in terms of an optimal or IFB
rule) the money supply is ﬁxed by the central banks to accommodate money demand. By
Walras’ Law we can dispense with the bond market equilibrium condition and therefore
the government budget constraint that determines taxes τt. Then the equilibrium deﬁned
at t = 0 as stochastic processes Ct, Dt, Pt, Mt, Wt, Yt, Nt, given past price indices and
exogenous TFP and government spending processes.
3.4 Linearization and State Space Representation
We now linearize about the deterministic zero-inﬂation steady state. Output is then at its
sticky-price, imperfectly competitive natural rate and from the Keynes-Ramsey condition
(4) the nominal rate of interest is given by ¯ ı = 1
β − 1. Now deﬁne all lower case variables
as proportional deviations from this baseline steady state.4








(1 − βξ)(1 − ξ)
(1 + βγ)ξ
mct (16)
mct = −(1 + φ)at +
σ
1 − h


















gt = ρggt−1 + ǫgt (20)
at = ρaat−1 + ǫat (21)
Variables yt, ct, mct, at, gt are proportional deviations about the steady state. πt and it
are absolute deviations about the steady state.5 For later use we require the output gap
the diﬀerence between output for the sticky price model obtained above and output when
4That is, for a typical variable Xt, xt =
Xt− ¯ X




where ¯ X is the baseline steady state. The
interest rate however is now expressed as an absolute deviation about ¯ i.










(1+h)σ (it − Etπt+1) = 0 where sg =
¯ G
¯ Y .
7prices are ﬂexible, ynt say. The latter, obtained by putting ξ = 0 into (16) to (19), is in
deviation form given by6:
σ
1 − h


































where zt = [at,gt,ct−1,cn,t−1,πt−1] is a vector of predetermined variables at time t and
xt = [ct,πt] are non-predetermined variables. Rational expectations are formed assuming
an information set {zs,xs}, s ≤ t, the model and the monetary rule.
3.5 Estimation
3.5.1 Overview
In this section we estimate four main variants of model (16)-(21) using Bayesian methods.
In particular, we estimate: the most general speciﬁcation of the model with both inﬂation
and habit persistence(we label this variant ’Z’); a version of the model without inﬂation
persistence but with persistence in habits (γ = 0, we label this variant ’G’); a version
without habit persistence but with persistence in inﬂation (h = 0, we label this variant
’H’); and ﬁnally a version with neither inﬂation nor habit persistence (γ = h = 0, we label
this variant ’GH’). We close the model with a 1-quarter ahead IFB rule of the form (29)
that is the subject of the next section.
Bayesian estimation of the model has the speciﬁc advantage that it provides a posterior
distribution of the parameter values that allows us to make probabilistic statements about
the functionals of the model(s)’ parameters. Furthermore, it provides us with the odds
on models that allow us to quantify how likely itis the data would have come from a
model with both habit and inﬂation persistence as opposed to a framework with just one
6Note that the zero-inﬂation steady states of the sticky and ﬂexi-price steady states are the same.
8of these mechanisms or neither. In this sense the estimation method per se supplies us
with a consistent measure of both parameter (posterior distribution of the parameters)
and model (posterior odds) uncertainty.7
The idea here is to utilize both measures of uncertainty in the construction of a policy
rule that, in the presence of such uncertainty, is robust in both the weak and strong
senses.8 The derivation of robust rules using consistent measures of parameter and model
uncertainty directly from estimation of the model thus advances upon existing studies
on the design of robust rules that instead ’calibrated’ uncertainty in an ad hoc fashion
(see, for example, Levin et al. (2001); Rudebusch (2002); Angeloni et al. (2003); Coenen
(2003).
The sub-sections below oﬀer: a brief sketch of the methods used in estimation (Subsec-
tion 3.5.2); a discussion of the speciﬁcation of the prior distributions (Sub-section 3.5.3);
the results from the estimation of our four model speciﬁcations (Sub-section 3.5.4); and
a formal comparison of models (Sub-section 3.5.5). This sub-section shows how we ob-
tain the posterior model probabilities that we use as weights for the competing model
speciﬁcations in the analysis of robust IFB rules under uncertainty.
3.5.2 Methodology
Each model indexed by k and denoted mk, has an associated set of unknown parameters
ωk ∈ Ωk. Following a Bayesian approach, our aim is to characterize the posterior distri-




,where Y T stands for the full sample of
observed data (T denotes the number of observations). Having speciﬁed a (perhaps model


















is the likelihood obtained under the assumption of normally dis-
tributed disturbances from the state-space representation implied by the solution of the
7Justiniano and Preston (2004) discuss the many additional advantages of using Bayesian methods to
estimate dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. These include overcoming convergence problems
with numerical routines to maximize the likelihood as well as providing measures of uncertainty that need
not assume a symmetric distribution.
8This paper for now only provides results for robustness with respect to model uncertainty. Current
research is investigating robustness with respect to parameter uncertainty.
9linear rational expectations model. The denominator in equation (26) corresponds to the
marginal likelihood (also known as the ‘marginal data density’) and, as explained later,
plays a key role in model comparisons.
The solution of the model is a non-linear function of the parameters which does not
allow for any closed-form expression for the posterior density. Furthermore, the high-
dimensionality of the parameters space renders numerical integration ineﬃcient. Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, however, provide a feasible and accurate approxi-
mation to this density.
Following Schorfheide (2000) the estimation follows a two step approach. In the ﬁrst
step, a numerical algorithm is used to approximate the posterior mode by combining the
likelihood L(Y T|ωk,mk) with the prior. In the second step, the obtained posterior mode is
then used as starting value (ω0
k) for a Random Walk Metropolis algorithm that generates
draws from the posterior p(ωk|Y T,mk). At each step i of the Markov Chain, the proposal
density used to draw a new candidate parameter ω∗
k is a normal centered at the current
state of the chain, N(ωi













k. We generate chains of 130,000 draws in
this manner discarding the ﬁrst 30,000 iterations.9
Point estimates of the parameters ωk can be obtained from the generated values by
using various location measures, such as mean or, as in this paper, medians. Similarly,
measures of uncertainty follow from computing the percentiles of the draws.
3.5.3 Data and Priors
We estimate the model(s) using quarterly US data on real GDP (detrended–as standard
in the literature we detrend this using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, see Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003), Juillard et al. (2004)), the Federal Funds rate (annualized, in percentage points),
and the annualized log diﬀerence of the consumer price index (CPI) for the sample 1984:I-
9This initial burn-in phase is intended to remove any dependence of the chain from its starting values.
102003:IV.10 All series were obtained from DataStream International.
Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) rather than de-meaning the series, we estimate
the mean of inﬂation and the (unobservable) real interest rate, π∗ and r∗ respectively,
together with the model(s) parameters. In turn, this gives the following mapping between
























































To proceed with the Bayesian estimation we need a prior distribution for the param-
eters. Details on our priors are presented in Table 1 in Appendix B reporting the type
of density, mean and standard deviation for each coeﬃcient.11 The last two columns also
provide the 1% and 99% percentiles of the prior ordinates. In choosing these densities we
considered the entire spectrum of prior existing empirical estimates or calibrations. As a
result, some of our priors are more widely dispersed, and therefore less tight than those
chosen by other authors. 12
The degree of habit formation (h), price indexation (γ) and interest smoothing in the
IFB-type rule (ρ), as well as the autoregressive coeﬃcients of the shocks (ρg and ρa) are all
constrained to the unit interval, motivating our choice of Beta densities for these priors.
The priors for h and γ are centered at 0.7, on the assumption that output and inﬂation
are considerably inertial, in line with ﬁndings by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Fuhrer (2000),
Banerjee and Batini (2003, 2004) and Smets and Wouters (2004)(SW, 2004), among others.
Likewise, our prior for the mean of ρ is rather high and close to the estimates from Clarida
et al. (2000) (CGG,2000).
10Eight observations, corresponding to the perior 1982:I - 1983:IV are used to intialize
the Kalman ﬁlter.
11In principle, is would be possible to specify ﬂat or non-informative priors for estimating θk. However,
in addition to being able to choose priors based on coeﬃcients values available in the literature, ﬂat priors
are not well suited for model comparisons.
12Throughout the estimation of diﬀerent models, the share of government expenditures in output is
calibrated at 0.22,which represents the sample average of this coeﬃcient for our sample.
11Priors for σ and φ are shaped in the form of a Gamma density and are chosen to be
fairly ﬂat, reﬂecting the wide dispersion of existing empirical estimates and calibrations
of these parameters in the literature. (see Nelson and Nikolov (2002)).
The slope of the Phillips’ curve, λ =
(1−βξ)(1−ξ)
(1+βγ)ξ is a function of the degree of price
stickiness in the economy, ξ, and the discount factor. So we selected the prior for λ in
line with the assumption that the quarterly discount factor is equal to 0.99 and prices are
sticky for three quarters, as suggested by survey evidence on the average duration of US
price contracts (see, for example, Blinder et al. (1998).13
Finally, the prior for θ accounts for the breadth of the spectrum of estimated responses
to expected inﬂation by the US Federal Reserve. More speciﬁcally, our speciﬁcation con-
tains the 90% posterior intervals of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)14 and it is fairly looser
than the prior speciﬁed by SW for the same parameter.15
3.5.4 Estimation Results
Table 2, Appendix B, summarizes the results of estimating the four model variants
(G,H,GH and Z). The three columns for each speciﬁcation report the median, 1st and
9th decile of the 100,000 draws generated using the Random Walk-Metropolis algorithm
used to approximate the posterior densities.
A few important things emerge from the table. First, estimates of the policy coeﬃcients
are fairly robust across speciﬁcations. Posterior estimates of ρ are tightly concentrated
on values that suggest a substantial degree of interest smoothing, in accordance with
results reported by CGG amongst other authors. Meanwhile, the posterior density for
θ is remarkably similar (that is both in medians and percentiles) across the ﬁrst three
speciﬁcations, implying a very aggressive response by the US Federal Reserve to expected
13It is worth noting that the results of the estimation from assuming a prior directly on the Calvo
coeﬃcient ξ are somewhat diﬀerent. This may be because with a prior on lambda, as we have used now,
the link between ξ and the discount factor in determining the slope of the PC is not imposed. We plan to
re-run the estimation with this alternative prior as a robustness check.
14Note that in contrast to these authors however we constrain the estimation to the region of determinacy
and therefore truncate the prior for θ. The results of their paper suggest, however, that at least for a Taylor
rule on current inﬂation, indeterminacy has not been an issue for our sample. In light of the results in
BLP, exploring whether their results extend to the estimation of IFB is left for a future project.
15 In their paper, however, SW include the output gap in the Taylor rule.
12inﬂation, in line with ﬁndings by CGG for a similar rule and sample.
The median estimates for r∗ translate into a median value of 0.995 for the stochastic
discount factor which, in turn, implies plausible estimates for the degree of price stickiness
based on the inferred values for λ. The implied point estimates of ξ range from 0.36 up
to 0.67, decreasing, as expected, depending on whether or not price indexation is allowed
for.16 These higher values are in accordance with Blinder et al. (1998) and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998), but contrast the high degree of price rigidity estimated by SW (2004).
Our estimates of σ are rather large. With no habits, these estimates map directly with
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and suggest that this may be quite small.17 A
common theme in papers estimating DSGE models is the diﬃculty in pinning down φ.
Therefore, it is not surprising that, inference on the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
is susceptible to the speciﬁcation of the model, and exhibits wide posterior probability
intervals.
Turning to the coeﬃcient governing habit formation, h is tightly estimated and suggests
rather inertial consumption and output processes. Reported posterior intervals for h are
almost identical to the ones obtained by Juillard et al. (2004) and higher than the estimates
by SW. By contrast, the posterior density of γ lies to the left of our chosen prior, suggesting,
in contrast to studies mentioned earlier, that inﬂation is intrinsically not very persistent
– a result that accords with ﬁndings in Erceg and Levin (2001), Taylor (2000) and Cogley
and Sargent (2001).
Estimates of the shock processes reveal that both the technology and the government
expenditure shock are highly persistent, and this holds true regardless of the exact model
speciﬁcation. Posterior estimates clearly attribute greater volatilty of shocks to the gov-
ernment expenditure component rather than to disturbances in technology.18
16Using λ ≡
(1−βξ)(1−ξ)
(1+βγ)ξ we obtain ξ = 0.67,0.36,0,60,0.53 corresponding to contract lengths,
1
1−ξ, of
3.06, 1.57, 2.50 and 2.13 quarters for models G, H, GH and Z respectively.
17This result is attributable to a prior density centered on high values for σ. Redoing the estimation
using the SW priors leads to point estimates far closer to one, clearly revealing that inference on this
parameters is sensitive to the choice of priors.
18 Indeed, the 1st posterior decile of the former exceeds the 9th decile of the latter, for all models,
despite similar prior densities for the innovation standard deviations. As usual, exogenous disturbances to
the monetary policy equation appear much less important than technology and government expenditure
shocks in driving inﬂation, consumption and output processes.
19
133.5.5 Model Comparison
Since the goal of this paper is to characterize the design of robust rules under uncertainty,
it is important to investigate which speciﬁcation seems to be best supported by the data.
In doing so we do not intend to select any particular model as being the ‘true’ one but
rather wish to compute posterior probabilities to place odds on the diﬀerent models.
Bayesian methods for model comparisons allows us to obtain these posterior model
probabilities in order to discriminate or aggregate across competing speciﬁcations, there-
after providing coeﬃcient estimates that explicitly account for model uncertainty. Let
us deﬁne mk to be one possible element from the (discrete) set of competing models
  = {G,H,GH,Z}. The posterior model probability for p(mk|Y T) summarizes the evi-
dence provided by the data in favor of mk and is then given by
p(mk|Y T) = f(Y T|mk)p(mk)/f(Y T) (27)
where p(mk) stands for the prior probability assigned to model k, that in our case equals 1
4
since we treat each model as equiprobable a-priori. The ﬁrst expression in the numerator is
known as the marginal likelihood (or marginal data density) and was previously presented













which emphasizes the key role the marginal likelihood plays in constructing odds on mod-
els.20 Computing the marginal likelihood usually requires simulation methods and a num-
ber of proposals in this vein are now available from the statistics literature.21
In this paper, instead we estimate the model probabilities by relying on the Reversible
Jump MCMC algorithm (RJMCMC) of Dellaportas et al. (2002)). This method belongs
20Notice that posterior model probabilities lead directly to the posterior odds that can be used to
compare two models, say mk and mh by updating the prior odds with the Bayes Factor.
21 Chib (2000) provides an excellent survey of simulation methods in general and discusses methods for
model comparison
14to the popular class of product space search algorithms, widely used in the statistic liter-
ature,22 that allow for the joint estimation of the model indicator, mk and parameters ωk
and which do not requiring therefor evaluating the marginal likelihood.23
Estimates of p(mk|Y T) obtained with the RJMCMC for our four model variants are
presented in Table 3, Appendix B. In line with results discussed above, the speciﬁcation
with habit persistence and no price indexation (G) attains highest posterior probability.
Model Z that allows for both of these intrinsic mechanisms follows in probability ranking.
In contrast, a model with no habit persistence is 9 times less likely than those speciﬁcations
(Z and G) with endogenous persistence in consumption. Finally, the most restrictive
model., GH attains the lowest posterior model probability further providing evidence of
the need to incorporate at least one of the two intrinsic mechanisms imparting greater
inertia to the model. Therefore, these results can be interpreted as suggesting that
the addition of endogenous mechanisms of persistence, particularly habit in consumption,
improve the ﬁt of the model. These posterior odds will be used to weight the models for
our analysis of uncertainty on the robustness of policy rules.
4 The Stability and Determinacy of IFB Rules
4.1 Theory
This section studies an IFB rule of the form
it = ρit−1 + θ(1 − ρ)Etπt+j (29)
22The interest reader is referred to Carlin and Han (2001) for an overview of these methods.
23The RJMCMC requires a set of preliminary runs in order to generate a proposal density, V (ωk|mk)
for each model’s parameters To this end we use the 100,000 draws generated for the estimation of the
parameters discussed above and choose V (ωk|mk) to be a normal density, centered at the mean of those
draws and with fatter tails than the posterior. The algorithm then operates over the product space
µ×Πk=1Ωk by drawing , at each step, a candidate model m
∗
k from a proposal density J -which in our case
assigns equals probability to all models- drawing ωk from V (ωk|mk) and then accepting or not the jump
to m
∗
k with a Metropolis type probability. We generated 200,000 draws in this manner, discard the ﬁrst
20,000 and then compute the proportion of draws the sampler spent in each model to directly obtain the
model probabilities.
15where j ≥ 0 is the forecast horizon, which is a feedback on single-period inﬂation over the
period [t + j − 1,t + j].24
With rule (29), policymakers set the nominal interest rate so as to respond to deviations
of the inﬂation term from target. In addition, policymakers smooth rates, in line with the
idea that central banks adjust the short-term nominal interest rate only partially towards
the long-run inﬂation target, which is set to zero for simplicity in our set-up.25 The
parameter ρ ∈ [0,1) measures the degree of interest rate smoothing. j is the feedback
horizon of the central bank. When j = 0, the central bank feeds back from current
dated variables only. When j > 0, the central bank feeds back instead from deviations
of forecasts of variables from target. Finally, θ > 0 is the feedback parameter: the larger
is θ, the faster is the pace at which the central bank acts to eliminate the gap between
expected inﬂation and its target value. We now show that, for given degrees of interest rate
smoothing ρ, the stabilizing characteristics of these rules depend both on the magnitude
of θ and the length of the feedback horizon j.
To understand better how the precise combination of the pair (j,θ), IFB rules can lead
the economy into instability or indeterminacy consider the deterministic model economy
(24) and (25) with interest rate rules of the form (29). gt and at are exogenous stable
processes and play no part in the stability analysis. For convenience, we therefore set
them to zero.
Let z be the forward operator. Taking z-transforms of (16), (17), (18) and (29), the
characteristic equation for the system is given by:
(z − ρ)[(z − 1)(z − h)(βz − 1)(z − γ) −
λ
 




(1 − ρ)(˜ φz +  (z − h))zj+2 = 0 (30)
where we have deﬁned λ ≡
(1−βξ)(1−ξ)
ξ , ˜ φ ≡
¯ C
¯ Y φ and   ≡ σ
1−h. Equation (30) shows that
the minimal state-space form of the system has dimension max(5,j + 3). Since there are
24To set the model up with this rule in state-space form for j ≤ 1 we simply need to augment the state
vector with a lagged term it−1. For j = 2 replace t with t + 1 in (16)-(17) and take expectations at time
t. Then the state-space presentations remains of the same dimension. For j > 2 replace t with t + j − 1
in (16)-(17) and take expectations at time t. The state vector must then be augmented with Etπt+1      
Etπt+j−2.
25For instance (29) can be written as ∆it =
1−ρ
ρ [θEtπt+j − it] which is a partial adjustment to a static
IFB rule it = θEtπt+j.
163 predetermined variables in the system, it follows that the saddle-path condition for a
unique stable rational expectations solution is that the number of roots inside the unit
circle of the complex plane is 3 and the number of outside the unit circle is max(2,j).
To identify values of (j,θ) that involve exactly three roots of equation (30) we graph
the root locus of (θ,z) pairs that traces how the roots change as θ varies between 0 and ∞.
All the graphs can be drawn by following the rules set out in Appendix A of BLP. Other
parameters in the system, including the feedback horizon parameter j in the IFB rule,
are kept constant. We generate separate charts, each conditioning on a diﬀerent horizon
assumption. Each chart shows the complex plane (indicated by the solid thin line),26 the
unit circle (indicated by the dashed line), and the root locus tracking zeroes of equation
(30) as θ varies between 0 and ∞ (indicated by the solid bold line). The arrows indicate
the direction of the arms of the root locus as θ increases. Throughout we experiment with
both a ‘high’ and a ‘low’ λ
µ, as deﬁned after (30). The economic interpretation of these
cases is that the high λ
µ case corresponds to low ξ (i.e., more ﬂexible prices) and low σ
1−h
(low risk aversion and habit formation).
The term inside the square brackets in equation (30) corresponds to no nominal interest
rate feedback rule (i.e., an open-loop interest rate policy). Then rule (29) is switched oﬀ
and so the lagged term it−1 disappears from our model; the system now requires exactly
two stable roots for determinacy. Figure 1 plots the root locus in this case. Since with no
policy θ is set to 0, the root locus is just a set of dots: namely, the roots of equation (30)
when θ = 0. Note that depending on the value of λ/ , the position of these roots varies,
and in the ﬂexible price, low interdependence case where λ
µ is high, there are complex roots
indicating oscillatory dynamics.27 The diagram shows that there are too many stable roots
in both cases (i.e. 3 instead of 2), which implies that with no interest rate feedback rule,
there will always be indeterminacy in the system.
If the nominal interest rate rule is switched on and now feeds back on current rather
than expected inﬂation, i.e. j = 0, then the root locus technique yields a pattern of zeros
as depicted in Figure 2. Interest rate smoothing brings about a lag in the short-term
26In this plane, the horizontal axis depicts real numbers, and the vertical axis depicts imaginary numbers.
If a root is complex, i.e. z = x + iy, then its complex conjugate x − iy is also a root. Thus the root locus
is symmetric about the real axis.
27How we ﬁnd the position of these zeros is the main example of Appendix A.
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(i) low λ/µ (ii) high λ/µ
Figure 1: Possible position of zeroes when θ = 0
1 −1 1 −1
(i) low λ/µ (ii) high λ/µ
ρ ρ
Figure 2: Position of zeroes as θ changes using current inﬂation
nominal interest rate and the system is now stable if it has exactly three stable roots (as
we now have three predetermined variables in the system). The ﬁgure demonstrates that
if θ is suﬃciently large, one arm of the root locus starting originally at ρ exits the unit
circle, turning one root from stable to unstable so that there are now three – as required
– instead of four stable roots and the system has a determinate equilibrium. As θ → ∞,
there are roots at ±i∞, two roots at 0, and one at  h/(˜ φ +  ), the latter shown as a
square.
Note that when θ = z = 1, the characteristic equation has the value 0, conﬁrming that
the branch of the root locus moving away from z = ρ crosses the unit circle at a value
θ = 1. Thus we conclude that for a rule feeding back on current inﬂation, the system
exhibits determinacy if and only if θ > 1. For higher values of j ≥ 1 we can draw the se-
quence of root locus diagrams shown in Figures 3-6, and so conﬁrm the well-known ‘Taylor
181 −1 1 −1
(i) low λ/µ (ii) high λ/µ
ρ ρ
Figure 3: Position of zeroes as θ changes: 1-period ahead expected inﬂation
1 −1 1 −1
(i) low λ/µ (ii) high λ/µ
ρ ρ
Figure 4: Position of zeroes as θ changes: 2-period ahead expected inﬂation
Principle’ that interest rates need to react to inﬂation with a feedback greater than unity.
However for j ≥ 1 our diagrams show that an arm of the root locus re-enters the unit
circle for some high θ > 1 and indeterminacy re-emerges. Therefore θ > 1 is necessary but
not suﬃcient for stability and determinacy. Our results up to this point are summarized
in proposition 1:
Proposition 1: For a rule feeding back on current inﬂation (j = 0), θ > 1 is
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for stability and determinacy. For higher
feedback horizons (j ≥ 1), θ > 1 is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for
stability and determinacy.
Now let ¯ θ(j) be the upper critical value of θ for the system for a feedback horizon j.
Figure 3 shows that for the case j = 1, i.e. one-quarter ahead forecasts which corresponds
19to a case studied by CGG (2000), indeterminacy occurs when this portion of the root
locus enters the unit circle at z = −1.28 The critical upper value for θ = ¯ θ(1) when this







2(1 + h)(1 + β)(1 + γ) 
λ(˜ φ +  (1 + h))
 
(31)
One important thing to note looking at this expression for a 1-period ahead IFB rule
is that the greater is the degree of smoothing captured by the parameter ρ in the interest
rate rule, the larger the maximum permissible value of θ before indeterminacy sets in. In
this sense indeterminacy is less of a potential problem for high ρ. Similarly from (31) the
problem of indeterminacy lessens for high h, γ and σ, and low λ and ˜ φ. Notice from the
deﬁnition of λ after (30) that low λ is associated with a high degree of price stickiness.
With this is mind we can summarize these results as:
Proposition 2: For a 1-period ahead IFB rule, indeterminacy is less of a prob-
lem if there is a high degree of interest rate smoothing, habit persistence, price
indexing, price stickiness and household risk aversion, and a low elasticity of
disutility with respect to hours worked.
Proceeding on to j-period ahead IFB rules for j ≥ 2 the analysis is more diﬃcult. For
j = 2, Figures 4 shows that indeterminacy occurs when the root locus enters the unit
circle at z = cos(ψ) + isin(ψ) for some ψ ∈ (0, π
2). All our results up to this point are
analytical using topological reasoning, but now the threshold ¯ θ(j) for j ≥ 2 must be found
numerically. Given j, write the characteristic equation as
max(5,j+3)  
k=1
ak(θ)zk = 0 (32)
noting that some of the ak are dependent on θ. The root locus meets the unit circle at
z = cos(ψ) + isin(ψ). Using De Moivre’s theorem zk = cos(kψ) + isin(kψ) and equating
real and imaginary parts we arrive at two equations which can be solved numerically for
¯ θ and ψ.
As well as locating an upper threshold ¯ θ(j), an even more signiﬁcant result concerning
indeterminacy emerges from Figure 4. This have been drawn in for values of ρ such that
28Thus Figure 3 portrays diagrammatically the result shown analytically by Woodford (2003), chapter
4, that there is a value of θ = θ
S say, beyond which there is indeterminacy.
20the two rightmost poles of the root locus are joined by straight lines that meet outside the
unit circle. The implication is that for some values of θ > 1, these yield unstable roots of
the system, and therefore the system will have exactly three stable roots which is what
is required for determinacy. (Note that if the arms of the root locus from ∞ cross the
unit circle before these latter meet, then there may anyway be too many stable roots).
However, for a lower value of ρ it could happen that rather than meeting to the right of
z = 1, the two arms instead meet to the left of z = 1, that is inside the unit circle and
then remain within it, as in ﬁgure 5. This would imply that for all θ there are always
more than three stable roots, which would entail, in turn, indeterminacy for all values of
θ. We therefore conclude that there is determinacy for θ slightly greater than 1 if the root
locus passes through z = 1 from the left, as in ﬁgures 3 and 4. Conversely, Figure 5 for
the left and middle examples show indeterminacy for all θ if the root locus passes through
z = 1 from the right. However, to be certain that this result is true for all θ, we need to
be able to show that once this arm of the root locus enters the unit circle it never leaves
it, as is the case in the right hand example of Figure 5. The simplest case for which this
‘pathological’ behaviour cannot happen is when h = γ = 0. We can now show:
Proposition 3: For the general model there is always some lead JS such that
for




(1 − β)(1 − γ)σ
λ(˜ φ + σ)
(33)
there is indeterminacy for all values of θ, provided that that the arm of the
root locus from the right is ‘non-pathological’ in the sense that it enters the
unit circle only once. If h = γ = 0 this is true if β > ρ >
√





Proof : See BLP, Appendix B.
For h,γ > 0 the derivation of suﬃcient conditions that rule out pathological behaviour
has proved elusive. However for small values of h,γ, the root locus diagrams correspond
to the ‘low λ/ ’ ones of Figures 2-4, with the inner arms that lie oﬀ the real axis becoming
vanishingly small as h,γ tend to 0. By a continuity argument therefore, it follows that the
suﬃcient conditions of Proposition 3 apply in this case as well for small h,γ. Numerical
experiments indicate that pathological behaviour does not occur for all realistic values of
the parameters. Indeed it is extremely diﬃcult to numerically produce diagrams such as
211 −1 1 −1
(i) low λ (ii) high λ
ρ ρ 1 −1
(iii) very lowλ
ρ
Figure 5: Position of zeros as θ changes: 3-period ahead expected inﬂation, and
low ρ
that on the right-hand-side of ﬁgure 5. For example with other parameters set at central
values the parameter ξ must exceed 0.9, corresponding the price contracts of 10 quarters
to generate such an example. In addition our calibrated values indicate that the suﬃcient
conditions in proposition 3 are easily satisﬁed.
Propositions 1 and 3 conﬁrm, in a rigorous setting, the possibility of real indeterminacy
for any IFB rule with lead j ≥ 1 when the feedback inﬂation is below unity (the Taylor
principle) and above a threshold ¯ θ(j). The root locus diagrams in ﬁgures 3 and 4 show
that ¯ θ(1) > ¯ θ(2), so that indeterminacy becomes more of a problem as j increases from
j = 1 to j = 2. Tables 1a-1f below shows that this deterioration continues for higher j and
eventually, from proposition 2, for high j no IFB rule of the form (29) results in a unique
stable equilibrium. The value of ρ is crucial in determining the critical value of the lead
j beyond which indeterminacy sets in. The lower ρ, the lower the maximum-permitted
inﬂation horizon the central bank can respond to, and hence, the larger the region of
indeterminacy under IFB rules. Thus the absence of interest rate smoothing has the same
indeterminacy-inducing eﬀect as high j.
In tables 1a parameter values are set as for model G (apart from θ which is calculated
to be the threshold value). Then the numerical calculations for alternative values of
parameters h, γ, λ, σ and φ are repeated in tables 1b-1f. The results show that proposition
2 which applies to 1-period ahead IFB rules only may well carry over to j-period ahead
22rules as well for changes to h, λ and γ, but not to σ and φ.
j j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j ≥ 5
¯ θ(j) 222 23.4 5.2 1.74 indeterminacy
Table 1a. Critical upper bounds for ¯ θ(j) for Model G. Parameter values:
h = 0.85, γ = 0, λ = 0.16, σ = 3.29, φ = 1.46.
j j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j ≥ 5
¯ θ(j) 171 17.5 2.8 1.72 indeterminacy
Table 1b. Critical upper bounds for ¯ θ(j) for Model G but with h = 0.
j j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j ≥ 4
¯ θ(j) 328 48.6 6.7 1.84 indeterminacy
Table 1c. Critical upper bounds for ¯ θ(j) for Model G but with γ = 0.5.
j j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j ≥ 5
¯ θ(j) 43 6.9 2.6 1.47 indeterminacy
Table 1d. Critical upper bounds for ¯ θ(j) for Model G but with λ = 1.
j j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j ≥ 5
¯ θ(j) 209 25.4 5.9 2.07 indeterminacy
Table 1e. Critical upper bounds for ¯ θ(j) for Model G but with σ = 1.
j j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j ≥ 4
¯ θ(j) 215 24.5 5.6 2.04 indeterminacy
Table 1c. Critical upper bounds for ¯ θ(j) for Model G but with φ = 3.
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1 period ahead
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Figure 6: Regions of Indeterminacy for single period inﬂation rate targets.
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Regions of Indeterminacy 
Figure 7: Regions of Indeterminacy for average inﬂation rate targets.
244.2 The Likelihood of Indeterminacy
Figures 6 and 7 show the indeterminacy for parameters ρ and θ based on model G. These
ﬁgures are based on 1000 draws of parameter combinations using the estimated parameter
distributions of section 2.5. Regions to the south-west of each contour then represent 100%
conﬁdence regions of determinacy. Figure 6 is drawn for single period IFB rules as in (29)
for j = 1,2,3,4. In ﬁgure 7, this is compared with an average IFB rule of the form




For both single-period ahead and average period rules, regions of determinacy indicate
combinations of ρ and θ that are weakly robust for all possible non-policy parameter com-
binations in model G. The declining size of this region as the forward horizon j increases
conﬁrms the earlier theoretical results that show that IFB rules with unique and stable
equilibria are increasingly constrained in the choice of (ρ,θ) with a qualitative change
taking place between j = 1 and j = 2.29
5 Optimal Policy and Optimized IFB Rules without Model
Uncertainty
Without model uncertainty, the policy problem of the central bank at time t = 1 is to
choose in each period t = 1,2,3,      an interest rate it so as to minimize a loss function
that depends on the variation of the output relative to an an output target ot = ynt + k,










(yt − ot)2 + bπ2
t + c(it − it−1)2 
 
(35)
where βc is the discount factor of the central bank. The term k is ambitious target for
output that exceeds the natural level of output. It arises because natural level of output
is not eﬃcient (owing to mark-up pricing in a monopolistically competitive intermediate
29Ideally we would like to locate the 100%, 95% etc conﬁdence regions of weak robustness across all
possible non-policy parameter combinations across all model variants. This will feature in a future version
of this paper.
30Notice this is a central bankers’ loss function, not a welfare function. It describes the actual policy
objectives banks have (or are instructed to have) rather than what they should have.
25goods, market power in the labour market and habit persistence). This ineﬃciency can
be seen from the model set out in BLP. Consider the steady state where Ct = Ct−1 = C
and Y = C + G. The utility of the representative household is found by choosing Y to
maximize
U =










After some rearrangement the ﬁrst order condition for the eﬃcient level of output, Y = Y ∗,
is

















where η and ζ are the elasticities for demand for diﬀerentiated labour and the diﬀerentiated
intermediate good respectively. Rearranging this gives the following expression for the
natural level of output Y n









κ(1 − h)σ (39)









< 1 − h (40)
In the absence of habit persistence (h = 0) this will also hold, but with habit persistence
it is possible that the steady state natural rate of output is too large, not too small. The
intuition here is that with habit persistence each household derive utility from consumption
at time t relative to hCt−1 where Ct is aggregate consumption considered exogenous by
each household. In equilibrium other households behave similarly and the consumption-
leisure choice of each household is distorted in favour of too much consumption and too
little leisure (therefore too much labour supply and output) compared with to the eﬃcient
choice of the central planner. Thus for high h and high values of elasticities ζ and η (which
reduce the eﬃciency in the output and labour markets) it is possible that k < 0 which will
lead to a negative inﬂation bias! However for elasticities suﬃciently close to unity (which
is consistent with empirical estimates) (40) will hold and k > 0. In fact in our simulations
we will set k = Y ∗−Y n
Y n > 0 thus implying combinations of these elasticities consistent with
this chosen value.
265.1 Optimal Policy with and without Commitment
Before turning to IFB rules, we compute the optimal policies where the policy maker can
commit, and the optimal discretionary policy where no commitment mechanism is in place.
We compare the performance of these policies with that of an estimated one-period-ahead
IFB rule. All parameter values apart from those deﬁning the central bank’s loss function
are based on model G as reported in section 2.5.31
In our linear-quadratic framework optimal policies (including those for optimal IFB
rules) conveniently decompose into deterministic and stochastic components. Let target
variables in (35) be written as sums of a deterministic stochastic components such as
yt = ¯ yt + ˜ yt where all variables are expressed in deviation form about the baseline zero-









(¯ yt − ¯ ot)2 + b¯ π2
t + c(¯ it −¯ it−1)2 + E0
 
(˜ yt − ˜ ot)2 + b˜ π2
t + c(˜ it −˜ it−1)2  
= ¯ Ω0 + ˜ Ω0 (41)
say. The policymaker can then design an optimal policy consisting of an open-loop tra-
jectory that minimizes ¯ Ω0 subject to the deterministic model plus a feedback rule that
minimizes ˜ Ω0 subject to a stochastic model expressing stochastic deviations about the
open-loop trajectory. By the property of certainty equivalence for full optimal policies,
but not optimized simple rules, the feedback rule is independent of both the initial val-
ues of the predetermined variables and the variance-covariance matrix of the white-noise
disturbances.
Figures 8-11 show the deterministic component of inﬂation and the output gap under
optimal policies compared with the trajectories under the estimated one-period ahead IFB
rule. The optimal policy under commitment provides a benchmark with which to compare
the loss in other policy rules. Comparing the optimal discretionary policy with the latter
gives an empirical assessment of the potential gains from commitment. In these simulations
we have set c = 1 in (35), k = 5% and calibrated b to result in an annual inﬂationary bias
(the long-run inﬂation rate) under discretion of 5%. This gave b = 2.5,1.5,0.85 for models
G, GH and Z respectively. The discount factor of the central bank was set at βc = 0.988
which corresponds to an annual discount rate of 5%.
31Details of solution procedures are provide in the Appendix.
27In ﬁgures 8 and 9 the central bank responds only to an ambitious output target k = 5%
with all predetermined variables at the beginning of period 1 at the baseline steady. In
ﬁgure 6 with commitment the central bank engages in a bout of inﬂation engineered by a
drop in the interest rate, but this quickly falls to close to zero. Under discretion however we
have the familiar inﬂationary bias of 1.3% per quarter used to calibrate b. Corresponding
to these inﬂation rates the output gap yt − yn
t in ﬁgure 7 rises by 0.22% moving a little
way towards its target of k = 5%, and then falls towards zero. Under discretion there is
a smaller rise in the output gap and in the long-run there is a permanent increase arising
from the small output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ in the model.
In ﬁgures 10 and 11 we suppress the ambitious output target by putting k = 0 and allow
the policymaker to engage in a deterministic stabilization exercise in response to a shock
to TFP of 1% at the beginning of period t = 1. We can now compare the stabilization
performance of the optimal rules with the estimated IFB rule. In ﬁgures 10 and 11 we
can see that the commitment policy stabilizes inﬂation and the output gap somewhat
better than the discretionary policy and that both optimal policies are far superior in this
respect to the estimated actual rule. In ﬁgures 12 and 13 we repeat this exercise for a
shock to government spending. From ﬁgure 12, this increases inﬂation and the central
bank responds by raising the real interest rate and moderating the increase in demand.
The ﬂexible price level of output rate ynt rises with government spending because the latter
crowds out consumption and households respond by supplying more labour. Aggregate
demand then rises, but by less than ynt and the net eﬀect of these changes in ﬁgure 11 is
to see the output gap initially fall before gradually returning to its steady state. In ﬁgure
13 changes in the natural level of output, ynt dominate the output gap yt − ynt, so there
are imperceptible diﬀerences between the policy rules.
5.2 Optimized IFB Rules
We now turn to optimized IFB rules and optimal Taylor-type rules feeding back on either
current inﬂation alone or on inﬂation and the output gap. The latter is expressed as
it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ)[θπt + θy(yt − yn
t )] (42)
Starting at the steady state rules of the form (29) or (42) are stabilization rules re-
sponding only to displacements of at and gt. In all the results from this point onwards



























Optimal Discretionary Policy 
Optimal Policy with Commitment 
Figure 8: Quarterly Inﬂation Rate (%) for Deterministic Optimal Policy. k =
5%, a(0) = g(0) = 0.


















Optimal Discretionary Policy  
Optimal Policy with Commitment 
Figure 9: Output Gap (% deviation from baseline) for Deterministic Optimal
Policy. k = 5%, a(0) = g(0) = 0.


























Optimal Policy with Commitment 
Estimated IFB Rule 
Optimal Discretionary Policy 
Figure 10: Quarterly Inﬂation Rate (%) for Stabilization Policy: Supply Shock,
k = 0%, a(0) = 1; g(0) = 0.























Optimal Policy with Commitment 
Optimal Discretionary Policy 
Estimated IFB Rule 
Figure 11: Output Gap (% deviation from baseline)for Stabilization Policy:
Supply Shock, k = 0%, a(0) = 1; g(0) = 0.
























Optimal Discretionary Policy 
Optimal Policy with Commitment 
Estimated IFB Rule
Figure 12: Quarterly Inﬂation Rate (%) for Stabilization Policy: Demand Shock,
k = 0%, a(0) = 0; g(0) = 1.
























Optimal Policy with Commitment
Optimal Discretionary Policy 
Figure 13: Output Gap (% deviation from baseline)for Stabilization Policy:
Demand Shock, k = 0%, a(0) = 0; g(0) = 1.
31we focus exclusively on stabilization policy by putting a0 = g0 = k = 0 so there is no
deterministic component of policy in response to an ambitious output target.32 Given the
estimated variance-covariance matrix of the white noise disturbances, an optimal combi-
nation (θ,ρ) can be found for each rule deﬁned by the time horizon j ≥ 0, and for the
Taylor rule, and optimal combination (θ,θy,ρ). The results are shown in tables 2 to 5 for
the estimated models G, GH, H and Z of section 2.5.
Rule ρ θ θy Loss Function % Output Equivalent
Estimated 1-period ahead IFB 0.80 2.56 0 2711 1.27
Feedback on πt 0.94 5.00 0 2696 0.90
Taylor Rule 0.97 4.03 0.09 2686 0.66
1-period ahead IFB 0.83 4.66 0 2708 1.20
2-period ahead IFB 0.58 2.65 0 2749 2.20
Optimal Commitment n.a. n.a. n.a 2659 0
Optimal Discretion n.a. n.a. n.a 3045 9.42
Table 2. Model G: Optimal Rules, Optimized Simple rules and the Estimated
1-period ahead IFB Rule Compared.33
32Since the IFB rule assumes a commitment mechanism, the policymaker in principle should be able to
implement a policy it = ¯ it plus a feedback component such as (29) or (42) relative to ¯ it, where the latter
is the optimal deterministic trajectory found in the previous section.
33Let Ω=loss from rule, Ω
OPT =loss from optimal rule with commitment. A 1% permanent fall in the
output gap leads to a reduction in the loss function of
1
2(1−βCB) = 41 in our calibration. The % output
equivalent loss is then a measure of the degree of sub-optimality of the IFB or Taylor Rule and is deﬁned
as
Ω−ΩOPT
41 × 100 where Ω
OPT = 125. In each model the weight b on inﬂation in (35) was chosen to give
an annual inﬂationary bias of 5%. Denoting this coeﬃcient by bs,s = G,GH,H,Z this gave calibrated
values bG = 2.5, bGH = 1.5, bH = 2.5 and bZ = 0.85. The central banker’s quarterly discount factor was
set at βc = 0.988 corresponding to an annual discount rate of 5%. Optimized simple rules were restricted
to the ranges ρ ∈ [0,1] and θ ∈ [1,5].
32Rule ρ θ θy Loss Function % Output Equivalent
Estimated 1-period ahead IFB 0.72 2.64 0 58.4 1.38
Feedback on πt 0.67 5.00 0 5.14 0.12
Taylor Rule 0.74 5.00 1.0 4.75 0.11
1-period ahead IFB 0.60 2.09 0 56.5 1.37
2-period ahead IFB 0.57 2.20 0 198 4.82
Optimal Commitment n.a. n.a. n.a 0.31 0
Optimal Discretion n.a. n.a. n.a 4.58 0.10
Table 3. Model GH: As for table 2.
Rule ρ θ θy Loss Function % Output Equivalent
Estimated 1-period ahead IFB 0.67 2.68 0 302 7.36
Feedback on πt 0.68 4.98 0 8.14 0.19
Taylor Rule 0.76 5 0.55 7.92 0.19
1-period ahead IFB 0.61 1.55 0 232 5.65
2-period ahead IFB 0.67 3.65 0 3421 83
Optimal Commitment n.a. n.a. n.a 0.19 0
Optimal Discretion n.a. n.a. n.a 7.93 0.19
Table 4. Model H: As for table 2.
Rule ρ θ θy Loss Function % Output Equivalent
Estimated 1-period ahead IFB 0.77 2.25 0 3812 10.8
Feedback on πt 0.92 4.64 0 3380 0.24
Taylor Rule 0.95 3.37 0.035 3380 0.20
1-period ahead IFB 0.83 2.82 0 3416 1.12
2-period ahead IFB 0.49 1.93 0 3708 8.2
Optimal Commitment n.a. n.a. n.a 3370 0
Optimal Discretion n.a. n.a. n.a 3519 3.63
Table 5. Model Z: As for table 2.
33A number of interesting observations emerge from table 2. First, for the most probable
model G, comparing the optimal policies with commitment and with discretion in table
2, the stabilization gain from commitment is equivalent to a 9.42% permanent increase in
output as seen by the last column. If the policymaker can commit using a simple rule,
the best one in this respect is a Taylor rule, and this realizes a large part of the potential
stabilization gains from commitment. Second, the estimated 1-period ahead IFB rule is
sub-optimal in its class by an output equivalent of only 0.07% increase in output. Third,
the determinacy conditions on ρ and θ severely constrain the range of possible stabilizing
rules and as a result compared with the Taylor rule, IFB rules perform very badly, especially
as j increases. This is what one would expect from proposition 2.
Comparing results across models, models GH and H where there is no habit persistence
exhibit quite diﬀerent results from models G and Z with habit persistence. First habit
persistence considerably increases the potential stabilization gains from commitment. In
its absence these gains drop to only 0.1% and 0.19% in models GH and H respectively. In
such a world there is less of a rationale for simple rules as commitment mechanisms and
indeed they fail to perform better than optimal discretion in terms of the policymaker’s
loss function. If there is a rationale it lies with possibility that the optimal discretionary
policy set out in Appendix A.2 gives indeterminacy when implemented as a rule. Although
the procedure set out computes a unique time consistent solution and policy rule of the
form it = Dzt, we ﬁnd for all models that if we plug the rule into the model we get do
indeterminacy. This raises a problem of how such a the rule can be implemented and leaves
us with a role for simple rules. Second, the poor performance of IFB rules carries over for
remaining models, especially for model H which combines an absence of habit persistence
with the indexing of Calvo contracts. Now a 2-period IFB rule results in an output
equivalent loss of 83%. The reason for this can be seen from proposition 2. Model H, as
well as exhibiting no habit persistence has a high degree of price ﬂexibility, a low degree of
household risk aversion and a high elasticity of disutility of work, all factors that encourage
indeterminacy according to proposition 2 and the numerical simulations in tables 1a-1f.
Since in a quarterly model, a 2-period is well within the practices of inﬂation-targeting
34central banks, we regard model H as implausible.34 We therefore conﬁne ourselves to only
three models, G, GH and Z in what follows.
6 Robust Rules with Model Uncertainty
6.1 Theory
In this section we consider model uncertainty in the form of uncertain estimates of the
non-policy parameters of the model, Θ = (β,γ,ξ,φ,σ,h,ρa,ρb,ζ,η,κ,σ2
at,σ2
gt). Suppose





































t−1] is a vector of predetermined variables at time t and
xt = [cs
t,πs
t] are non-predetermined variables in state s of the world. In (43) and (44) it is
important to stress that variables are in deviation form about a zero-inﬂation steady state
of the model in state s. For example output in deviation form is given by ys
t =
Y s
t −¯ Y s
¯ Ys where
¯ Y s is the steady state of the model in state s deﬁned by parameters Θs and is
t = it −¯ is
where the natural rate of interest in model s, ¯ is = 1
βs − 1.
Our approach to robust policy design is to set up a composite model of outputs from
each of the states s = 1,2,   ,n and to minimize the expected loss across these states using
the posterior probabilities obtained in section 2.5. To do so we must set up the model in
state s in terms of the actual interest rate, not the deviation about the steady state. Then


























; s = 1,2,     ,n (45)
34This is also borne out by an alternative Modiﬁed Harmonic Mean estimator proposed by Geweke














t − ¯ os
t)2 + b(¯ πs




t − ˜ os
t)2 + b(˜ πs
t)2 + c(˜ it −˜ it−1)2  
(46)
In (46) the output target in state s of the world is given by os
t = ynt + ks where the




n depends on s. In fact we will continue to assume
that the central bank has no ambitious output targets and set ks = 0 in its loss function.
However with model uncertainty there is still a deterministic component of policy arising
from diﬀerences in the natural rate of interest compatible with zero inﬂation in the steady
state, ¯ is = 1
βs − 1.35 A rule specifying it = ¯ is in the long-run will only result in zero
inﬂation in model s. From the consumers’ Euler equation (4) in model r with βr > βs,
implementing the rule designed for model s gives a steady state inﬂation rate ¯ πr given by
βr(1 +¯ is)
(1 + ¯ πr)
=
βr
βs(1 + ¯ πr)
= 1 i.e., ¯ πr =
βr
βs − 1 > 0 (47)
Our robust rule designed for any model speciﬁes a natural zero inﬂation rate of interest¯ iR,
corresponding to a discount factor βR = 1
1+¯ iR to result in an expected long-run inﬂation













That is, βR is the expected value of βs across the model variants.
There is one ﬁnal consideration ﬁrst raised by Levine (1986) that is usually ignored
in the literature. Up to now we have assumed that private sector expectations Etxs
t+1
are state s model-consistent expectations. In other worlds in each state of the world the
private sector knows the state and faces no model uncertainty. In a more general formula-
tion of the problem we can relax this assumption and assume that both the policymaker
and the private sector faces model uncertainty. Suppose that in state s of the world the
latter believes model s′ with probability qss′. Then Etxs




t+1 and the model no longer decomposes into independent
systems. In the results that follow we bypass this complication and conﬁne ourselves to
model-consistent expectations in each state of the world.
35In fact estimated diﬀerences in β
s between models are not great, so the point we make here is only
potentially important.
366.2 Robust Rules Across Three Rival Models
We now report results for IFB rules with horizon j = 0,1,2 for three rival models G, GH
and Z. The diagonal elements of table 6 gives the policymaker’s losses obtained previously
in tables 2 to 5 when the optimal rule designed for model s=G, GH, Z is implemented
in that model. Figures in brackets refer to output equivalent % losses. We refer to these
rules as IFBj(s) for horizon j = 0,1,2. The oﬀ-diagonal entries show the loss outcome
when the rule designed for model s is implemented on model r  = s. A striking pattern
emerges from this table: whereas the current inﬂation rules IFB0 are remarkably robust
across models, this is no longer true for IFB1 and IFB2 rules. An IFB1 rule designed
for the wrong model perform particularly badly in model GH with losses increasing to an
equivalent of a permanent decrease in output of around 10%. Matters become worse for
the IFB2 rule. Optimal rules designed for models G and H give indeterminacy in model
GH.
Rule Model G Model GH Model Z
IFB0(G) 2696 (0.90) 7.48 (0.18) 3380 (0.24)
IFB0(GH) 2698 (0.95) 5.14 (0.12) 3381 (0.27)
IFB0(Z) 2698 (0.95) 6.90 (0.16) 3380 (0.20)
IFB1(G) 2708 (1.20) 397 (9.67) 3429 (1.44)
IFB1(GH) 2716 (1.39) 56.5 (1.39) 3430 (1.46)
IFB1(Z) 2712 (1.29) 441 (10.8) 3416 (1.12)
IFB1(Robust) 2709 (1.22) 64.1 (1.56) 3418 (1.17)
IFB2(G) 2749 (2.20) indeterminacy 3745 (9.2)
IFB2(GH) 2752 (2.27) 198 (4.82) 3732 (8.83)
IFB2(Z) 2759 (2.44) indeterminacy 3708 (8.2)
IFB2(Robust) 2751 (2.24) 189.4 (4.83) 3734 (8.88)
Table 6. Value of Loss Function for Diﬀerent Rules with Model Uncertainty36
36Current Inﬂation (s) denotes the optimal rule feeding back on πt designed for model s = G,GH,Z.
Similarly IFBj(s) denotes the outcome from the j-horizon IFB rule designed for model s. Each row then
gives the value of the loss function for models s = G,GH,Z. The % output equivalent losses are in
brackets. Diagonal elements correspond to losses in tables 2 to 5.
37A simple solution to the lack of robustness of rules IFB1 and IFB2 is to design them on
the assumption that the world is characterized by zero habit persistence and price indexing,
i.e., by model GH. However by using the procedure set out in the previous subsection we
can do better and design a robust rules that shields against indeterminacy in all states and
performs better on average across models. Using the probabilities pG = 0.56, pGH = 0.12
and pZ = 0.32 for models G, GH and Z respectively, table 7 reports the optimal robust
rule. The relevant rows of table 6 show that, compared with the rule designed for model
GH, our robust rule sacriﬁces performance in model GH (which only occurs with low
probability) for better performance in the more probable states G and H.
Robust Rule ρ θ
1-period ahead IFB 0.830 3.442
2-period ahead IFB 0.574 2.261
Table 7. Robust IFB Rules.
7 Conclusions
Both our theoretical results on IFB rules in section 3 and our numerical results of that and
later sections indicate that they become increasing prone to the problem of indeterminacy
as the forward horizon increases from j = 0 to j = 2. As a consequence optimized rules
of this type perform increasing worse too. For j = 2 we found that the strongly robust
rule oﬀers little improvement over the weakly robust rule that only shielded the economy
against indeterminacy.
In view of this result the question arises of why do central banks pursue forward-looking
targeting rules in the ﬁrst place? Two main reasons for favouring such rules are commonly
cited. First, the delayed response of inﬂation to interest rate changes obliges monetary
authorities to react in a pre-emptive fashion to expected inﬂation in the future. Second,
by targeting inﬂation in the future in a simple and accountable fashion, the central bank
can respond to shocks whilst at the same time providing the private sector with assurances
that inﬂation will eventually return to its long-run target of zero inﬂation, in our set-up.
Of these two reasons only the second is compatible with our analysis. Central banks can
only target forecasts of future inﬂation and these can only be conditional on information
38available at the time the interest rate is set, i.e., the state vector at time t in (24). By
committing to a rule that feeds back on inﬂation j ≥ 1 periods ahead, since this forecast
can be expressed as a linear combination of these state variables, the authority is severely
constraining how the interest rate should in eﬀect respond to this information, and it is
this constraint that lies at the heart of the poor performance of these rules. It may well
be the case that a long forward horizon is necessary to establish the commitment to a low
inﬂation target, but this credibility argument needs to be formalized.
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42A Computation of Policy Rules












where zt is an (n − m) × 1 vector of predetermined variables including non-stationary
processed, z0 is given, wt is a vector of policy variables, xt is an m × 1 vector of non-
predetermined variables and xe
t+1,t denotes rational (model consistent) expectations of
xt+1 formed at time t. Then xe








yt+1 = Ayt + Bwt (A.2)
Deﬁne target variables st by
st = Myt + Hwt (A.3)



















where Q = MTQ1M, U = MTQ1H, R = Q2 + HTQ1H, Q1 and Q2 are symmetric
and non-negative deﬁnite R is required to be positive deﬁnite and λ ∈ (0,1) is discount
factor. The procedures for evaluating the three policy rules are outlined in the rest of this
appendix (or Currie and Levine (1993) for a more detailed treatment).
A.1 The Optimal Policy with Commitment
Consider the policy-maker’s ex-ante optimal policy at t = 0. This is found by minimizing






t Qyt + 2yT
t Uwt + wT
t Rwt) +  t+1(Ayt + Bwt − yt+1) (A.6)
where  t is a row vector of costate variables. By standard Lagrange multiplier theory we
minimize




43with respect to the arguments of L0 (except z0 which is given). Then at the optimum,
L0 = Ω0.
Redeﬁning a new costate vector pt = λ−1 T
t , the ﬁrst-order conditions lead to
wt = −R−1(λBTpt+1 + UTyt) (A.8)
λATpt+1 − pt = −(Qyt + Uwt) (A.9)
Substituting (A.8) into (A.2)) we arrive at the following system under control
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To complete the solution we require 2n boundary conditions for (A.10). Specifying z0






λtpt = 0 (A.11)
and the initial condition








is partitioned so that p1t is of dimension (n − m) × 1. Equation
(A.3), (A.8), (A.10) together with the 2n boundary conditions constitute the system under
optimal control.


























































partitioned so that S11 is (n − m) × (n − m) and S22 is m × m is the solution to the
steady-state Ricatti equation
44S = Q − UF − FTUT + FTRF + λ(A − BF)TS(A − BF) (A.18)







where Zt = ztzT
t . To achieve optimality the policy-maker sets p20 = 0 at time t = 0. At
time t > 0 there exists a gain from reneging by resetting p2t = 0. It can be shown that
N22 < 0, so the incentive to renege exists at all points along the trajectory of the optimal
policy. This is the time-inconsistency problem.
A.2 The Dynamic Programming Discretionary Policy






t Qyt + 2yT
t Uwt + wT
t Rwt + λΩt+1] (A.20)
The dynamic programming solution then seeks a stationary solution of the form wt =
−Fzt in which Ωt is minimized at time t subject to (1) in the knowledge that a similar
procedure will be used to minimize Ωt+1 at time t + 1.
Suppose that the policy-maker at time t expects a private-sector response from t + 1
onwards, determined by subsequent reoptimisation, of the form
xt+τ = −Nt+1zt+τ, τ ≥ 1 (A.21)
The loss at time t for the ex ante optimal policy was from (A.8) found to be a quadratic
function of xt and p2t. We have seen that the inclusion of p2t was the source of the time
inconsistency in that case. We therefore seek a lower-order controller wt = −Fzt with
the cost-to-go quadratic in zt only. We then write Ωt+1 = 1
2ZT
t+1St+1Zt+1 in (A.20). This
leads to the following iterative process for Ft
wt = −Ftzt (A.22)
where







Rt = R + KT
t Q22Kt + U2TKt + KT
t U2
Kt = −(A22 + Nt+1A12)−1(Nt+1B1 + B2)
Bt = B1 + A12Kt
Ut = U1 + Q12Kt + JT
t U2 + JT
t Q22Jt
Jt = −(A22 + Nt+1A12)−1(Nt+1A11 + A12)
45At = A11 + A12Jt




t RtFt + λ(At − BtFt)TSt+1(At − BtFt)
Qt = Q11 + JT
t Q21 + Q12Jt + JT
t Q22Jt
















, and Q similarly are partitioned
conformably with the predetermined and non-predetermined components of the state vec-
tor.
The sequence above describes an iterative process for Ft, Nt, and St starting with some
initial values for Nt and St. If the process converges to stationary values, F,N and S say,










A.3 Optimized Simple Rules
We now consider simple sub-optimal rules of the form






where D is constrained to be sparse in some speciﬁed way. Rule can be quite general. By
augmenting the state vector in an appropriate way it can represent a PID (proportional-
integral-derivative)controller (though the paper is restricted to a simple proportional con-
troller only).








where P = Q+UD+DTUT +DTRD. The system under control (A.1), with wt given by
(A.3), has a rational expectations solution with xt = −Nzt where N = N(D). Hence
yT
t Pyt = zT
t Tzt (A.26)
where T = P11 − NTP21 − P12N + NTP22N, P is partitioned as for S in (A.17) onwards
and
zt+1 = (G11 − G12N)zt (A.27)
where G = A + BD is partitioned as for P. Solving (A.27) we have
zt = (G11 − G12N)tz0 (A.28)










where Zt = ztzT
t and V satisﬁes the Lyapunov equation
V = T + HTV H (A.30)
where H = G11 − G12N. At time t = 0 the optimized simple rule is then found by
minimizing Ω0 given by (A.29) with respect to the non-zero elements of D given z0 using
a standard numerical technique. An important feature of the result is that unlike the
previous solution the optimal value of D, D∗ say, is not independent of z0. That is to say
D∗ = D∗(z0)
A.4 The Stochastic Case

















where ut is an n × 1 vector of white noise disturbances independently distributed with
cov(ut) = Σ. Then, it can be shown that certainty equivalence applies to all the policy
rules apart from the simple rules (see Currie and Levine (1993)). The expected loss at
time t is as before with quadratic terms of the form zT
t Xzt = tr(Xzt,ZT

























where Et is the expectations operator with expectations formed at time t.
















































The optimimized simple rule is found at time t = 0 by minimizing ΩSIM
0 given by









or, in other words, the optimimized rule depends both on the initial displacement z0 and
on the covariance matrix of disturbances Σ.
471% 99%
ρi     B 0.75 0.15 0.538 0.981
θ     G 1.7 0.5 1.099 3.074
λ     G 0.15 0.1 0.044 0.473
φ     G 1.75 0.5 1.148 3.118
σ     G 1.5 0.8 0.609 3.952
γ     B 0.7 0.1 0.566 0.897
h     B 0.7 0.1 0.566 0.897
ρa     B 0.7 0.15 0.492 0.959
ρg     B 0.7 0.15 0.492 0.959
π
*
    G 4 2 1.745 10.045
r*     G 2 1 0.872 5.023
sdg     IG1 1.7 inf 0.635 9.260
sde     IG1 1 inf 0.372 5.699
sda     IG1 1.7 inf 0.635 9.260
For all models, g  is calibrated to 0.22. Distributions: G 
(Gamma), B (Beta),  and ), IG1 ( Inverse Gamma-1).   ρ 
corresponds to the autoregressive coefficient of an AR(1) 
process. sd  stands for the standard deviation of the shocks. .Last 
two columns,  report the inverse cumulative distribution function 
of each prior ordinate for thepercentiles 0.01 and 0.99. 





APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION RESULTSModel  Model G Model H  Model GH  Model Z 
Posterior Distribution Posterior Distribution Posterior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Coefficient Median  10% 90% Median  10% 90% Median  10% 90% Median  10% 90%
ρi 0.80 [ 0.73 , 0.85 ] 0.67 [ 0.55 , 0.75 ] 0.72 [ 0.64 , 0.79 ] 0.77 [ 0.71 , 0.83 ]
θ 2.55 [ 2.15 , 2.99 ] 2.68 [ 2.18 , 3.29 ] 2.64 [ 2.14 , 3.20 ] 2.25 [ 1.86 , 2.58 ]
λ 0.16 [ 0.08 , 0.30 ] 0.71 [ 0.49 , 0.98 ] 0.27 [ 0.14 , 0.44 ] 0.47 [ 0.25 , 0.74 ]
φ 1.46 [ 1.06 , 1.94 ] 2.40 [ 1.70 , 3.15 ] 2.16 [ 1.47 , 2.77 ] 1.32 [ 0.99 , 1.81 ]
σ 3.29 [ 2.28 , 4.98 ] 2.50 [ 1.47 , 4.29 ] 3.91 [ 2.86 , 5.76 ] 3.23 [ 2.55 , 4.21 ]
γ 0.59 [ 0.45 , 0.72 ] 0.54 [ 0.40 , 0.68 ]
h 0.85 0.74 , 0.91 0.85 [ 0.73 , 0.92 ]
ρa 0.91 [ 0.85 , 0.94 ] 0.91 [ 0.87 , 0.94 ] 0.90 [ 0.85 , 0.93 ] 0.94 [ 0.89 , 0.96 ]
ρg 0.92 [ 0.88 , 0.95 ] 0.91 [ 0.88 , 0.93 ] 0.90 [ 0.87 , 0.93 ] 0.93 [ 0.89 , 0.96 ]
π
* 3.00 [ 2.43 , 3.60 ] 2.72 [ 2.14 , 3.32 ] 2.96 [ 2.40 , 3.51 ] 2.88 [ 1.75 , 3.55 ]
r* 1.86 [ 1.38 , 2.49 ] 1.82 [ 1.26 , 2.48 ] 1.90 [ 1.33 , 2.46 ] 1.80 [ 1.25 , 2.38 ]
sdg 2.19 [ 1.99 , 2.39 ] 3.23 [ 2.53 , 4.17 ] 2.75 [ 2.35 , 3.11 ] 2.23 [ 2.05 , 2.47 ]
sde 0.17 [ 0.15 , 0.19 ] 0.20 [ 0.18 , 0.23 ] 0.17 [ 0.16 , 0.19 ] 0.19 [ 0.17 , 0.21 ]
sda 0.78 [ 0.61 , 1.01 ] 0.51 [ 0.42 , 0.64 ] 0.59 [ 0.48 , 0.74 ] 0.72 [ 0.57 , 0.93 ]
Table 2: Parameter estimates for j=1 
Median and posterior deciles of the draws generated with a Random Walk Metropolis algorithm. Discarded the first 
30,000 draws, retained the remaining 100,000 values 
( h = 0 ) ( γ = 0 )  ( γ = h= 0 ) 
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION RESULTSModel 
G ( γ = 0 ) 
H ( h= 0)
GH ( γ =h= 0 )
Z
Table 3: Model Comparisons
Reversible MCMC of Dellaportas et al. (2002). 100,000 draws to obtain the 
proposal densities.  For the Metropolis step, Discarded the first 20,000 values and 
retained the remaining 180,000. Posterior odds P(m|data)  based on assigning each 
model equal prior probability.  Model proposal density assigns equal probability to 
the jump to any of four possible models, regardless of the current model in the 
chain. 




Reversible Jump MCMC 
0.03
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION RESULTS